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CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES
in
CONPACTS OF SALE
The question as to whena stipulation in a contract
is a condition and when a warranty has given rise to con-
sideralle confusion and misapprehension. The authorities
pon this poin8 are nmereus and not always harmonious.
My purpose is to collate and discuss the principal Ung-
lish cases, to set out, if possible, what the law is and
to ploint out some of its inconsistencies. Perhaps I
can best point out the distinction in effect between a
condition and a warranty, and alse,, incidentally how the
question may arise, bl! quoting from the opinion of Lep
in'Be4n v. Burness, 3 S. & , 751. He says,-
'Properly sp-aking a representation is a statenent or as-
sertion made by one party to the other or at the tine
(f the contract of some matter or circumstanco relating
to it. Though it is sometimes contained in the writtel
instrument it is not an integral part of the contract;
and, consequently, the contract is not broken though the
representation proves to be untrue; nor (with the excep-
tion of policies of insurance, at all events maritime
policies, which stand on a peculiar anomalous footing)
is such untruth any cause of action, nor has it any eff I-
Oac:i whatever unless the representation *"a made fraudu-
lently, either by reason of its being made with knowledge
of its untruth, or by reason of its being ma4e if honest-
ly, with a recklesa ignorance of whether it was true or
untrue. Representations are not usually contained in th
the written instrument of dontraot yet they some times
are. But it, is plain that their insertion threrin can-
not alter their nature. The quedtion however may arise,
whether a desorlptive statement in a written inatrument
is a mere representation or whether it is a substantive
part of the centract. This Is a question of construe-
tion which the court and not the jury must determins.
If the court should come to the conclusion that such a
statement by one party was intended to be a substantive
part of the contract and not a mere representation, the
oft-discussed question may of course" be raised whether
this part of the contract is a condition precedent, or
only an independedt agreement a breach of which will not
Justify a repudiation of the *ontract but will only be a
cause of action for a oampensation in damages'.
A dstination in effect, between a condition prece-
dent and an indeperzent agreement or warranty is here
pointed out, namely, the breach of a condition gives the
promi.tee a right. to repudiate the whole contract, while
the breach of a warranty does not release him from his
o ntract but is only ground* for an action for damages.
How are we to distinguish between those statements or rep-
resentations which are conditions and those which are in-
dependint agreements or wafranties.
Considerable uncertainty and obscurity is caused on
this point by the unfortunate use of the word warranty.
Aseon gives five senses In which this word has been used.
It is not necessary te enumerate them here but another
quotation from the opinion of A . -r^ n the above
case will serve as an example of the many senses in
which this word is used. At one place he says;- 'ZI
the court shoul 4 *Onp to the conclusion that such a
statem-,nt by one party was intended to be a substantive
part of his iontract, and not a mre representation, the
oft-discussed question may, of course be raised, whethe&
this prt Uf the contract is a ocndition precedent or on-1-
Zy an independent agreeret. And again-- *If such do-
ecripttga statement was intended to be a substantive
part of the contract it is to be regarded as a warranty
that is to say, a condition on the failure or nonperform-
ance of which the other party may, if he is so minded,
repudiate the contract in toto. If, indeed, he has re-
ceived the whole, or any substantial part of the consider
at ion *4t-h--&Apromise on his part the warranty loses the
character of : or ndition, or, to speak perhaps more prop-
erl,, ceases to be available as a condition and beeon es a
warranty in the narrower sense of the word, viz., a, stip-
niation by way of agreement for the breach of which the
compensatinn may be sought in damages".
In the above quotations it will be observed that the
word warranty is given at least three distinct meanings
and condition end warranty are used as synonymous terms.
I shall use the word warranty asmeaning an independent
sibsidiary promise, collateral to the rnin object of the
contract. This is the use of the word adopted by Sir
William .nson. (See Ansonon Contracts, Par- 295 N. 1).
In the earlier cases upon this subject the coutts do
not seem to- have considered the intention ef the parties
as being of any importance whatever, Theit decisions
are based upon a narrow and teOhniel const'uotiOn of the
language of the instriuefnt. Thtas in 15 Henry VII. 10
P1. 17, it was ruled by Fineu= C. J., that if one Oove-
nant with me to serve me for a Mear, and I covenant with
him to give him twenty pounds if I do not aay, for the
cause aforesaid he shall have an action fo$r the twenty
pounds although he never serv-'s me; otherwise it is if I
say that ho shall haie twenty pounds for the cause afore-
said. lo, if I eovenant with a man that t will marry
his daughter and he covenants with me that he will make
an estat- to me and hiisdughter, and the heirs of our
two bodies begotten, if I afterwardg marry another woman,
or his daughter marries another man, yet I shall have an
action of covenant against him'to compel him to make the
estate; but if the covenant wete that he waald make the
estate to us two forthe cause aforesaid, in that case he
wo Ild not mane the estate until we were married.
In later oases the rule has been established that
the dependo_ or iodependelig of covenants is to be Col-
lected from the evident sense and meaning of t-e parties.
(See per Lord Mansfield, in Jones v, Varelay, 2 Doug.,
684 - 691).
T1is is the rule by which the courts are now govern-
ed in deciding such question:i. (Bettini v. Gye,,l Q. B.
D., l8Zs). In theory it is simple but, for some reason
or other, it is very difficult of application.
Mr. Lenjamin gives five rules for discovering this
intention. (3ee Benjamin on Sales, Par. 562).
04t. Where a day i appointed for doing any act and
the day is to happed or may happen before the promise by
the other party is to be performed, the latter my bring
action before performance, which is not a ctndition pre-
eadent; aliter, if the day fixed is to happen after the
rerformance, for then the performance is deemed to be a
condition precedent.
2nd. When a covenant or promise goes only to part
of the consideration and a breach of it may be piid for
in damages it is an independent covenant not a condition.
3rd. Where the mutual promises go to the whole con-
sideration on both sides they are mutu~l conditions pre-
cedent formerly called dependent conditions.
4C.h. Where each party is to do an act at the same
time as the other, as where goods in a sale for cash are
to be delivered by the vendor, and the price to be paid
by the buyer, these are concurrent conditions and neither
party can maintain an action for breach of contract with-
Out averrkng that he performed or offered to perform
wh:-t he himself was bound to do.
5th. Whe-e from the considoration of the whole in-
strLnent it is Clear that the one part y relied upon his
remedy, and not upon the perforrmnse of his condition by
the other, such a condition &a not a condition precedent.
But if the intention was to rellx upon the performance ofh
the promise and not on the remedy, the performance is not
a eondition ',reeedent.
These are substantially the rules givenin the not's
to Pordage V. Ole, 14Wm. Saiinders, --'./320, Note B.,
also Cutter v. Powleol, 2 S. L. C. 1, They are not abhe-
lute, howeVer, and if the 4nstrument, when construed ae-
aording to them, disolosesyan intention which is not the
apparent intention of the parties the court will disre-
gard them.,i ,
In Roberts v. Brett,i18 C. B., 551, there was an a-
greement datd the 15 th of May, by which the plaintiff
0ovenanted fdrthwith to pociure a wessel and stew On %
board a certain telegraphic cable, then at 1orden's
wharf, and to rig,provision and man her, and to have her
ready, for sea at the Nora on or before the 15th of July.
The defendant eovenarnted to pay the plaintiff #e4-.4-
i5000 by Instalments,- -1 000 seven days after tka ar-
rnVw 1 of theovessel at lhorden's wharves, J2 000 on or be-
fore the expiration of twenty one days after the vessel
should have arrived alongside ,.%orden's wharf and tbe re-
maining 42 000 as soon as she had put to sea from the
Nort,, nd also to give the plaintiff 500 shares in a cer-
tain company, It was also mut' ally agreed that each par-
ty should, within ten days after the execution of the a-
greement, give and execut,?oto the other a bond Vith two
sureties in the sum oft5 000 for the performance of the
covenants on his part. In an action upon this agreement
the breaches assigned being non-payment b, the defendant
of the five thousand pounds or amypart thereof and non-
delivery oftthe shares: held, that the exeeution of the
bond by the plaintiff was a condition precedent to his
right to sue for such breaches. For the plaintiff it
was urged that the Oase came within the first rule in the
notes to Portage v. Cole,(slpra), aswthe liability to pay
the 1I 000 ,-might accrue before the time at which it was
stipulated tklt the bond should be given; and also, that
it .ame within the third rule (Mr. Benjamin's -- rule)
as it was a:,oovenant going only to part of the consider-
ation on both sides a breach of which might be paid for
in darmges- Jervis, C. J.:-" I am of the opinion that
the giving of .- bond by the plaintiff was a condition
preoedent to the obligation on the defendant's part to pv
pay the (5 000 or any part of it. If we were to act
simplr on the first rule in Portage v. Co
4 that where a
day is appointed for doing an act, and the day is to happ-
pen or may happen before the thing which is the consider-
ation for it is to be perforned, the condition is dis-
pensed with,- and were to assume here that the plain-
tiff was bound at once to begin to prepare the vessel,
So that it was certain that the seven days after her ar-
rival alongside M.1orden's wharf when the first paynnt of
'51,00 would be fe must expive before the lapse of the
period for giving, the bonds, we Mi;ht feel some diffi-
culty in arriving at the conclusion we have come to. But
after all, that rule only professes to give the result of
the intention of the parties: and where on the whole, it
is apparent that the intention is that that which is to-$&
done first is not to depend upon the performance of the
thing thAt is to be done afterwards, the parties are re-
-lying on their remedy, nd, not on the performanee of the
eondition; but where you plainly see that it is their in-
tention to ely on the Condition, and not on the remedy,
the perory-nde of' the thing is a condition procedentV.
However unsatisfaetory, in some respects, the rea-
soning upon whiah this ease is decided, the rule is there
very Olearly laid down that the intention of the parties
When it can be disoovered is to be the controlling eon-
sideration and that the rules to Portare & Coikwill not
be decisive where it clearly appears that the parties
contemplated different results.
The 2nd and 3rd of these rules are the most import-
ant. In almost every case the question to be decided
is, whether the promise goes only Lo part of the consider
ation or whether it goes to the root of the whole agree-
mont. I propose ncw to examine and discuss the eases
comirg, under these two rules.
In ccnsidering whether a propise or stipulation goes
to the whole or only to a part of the consideration it
is necessary.- to take into account the circumstances under
which, and the purpoees for which, the contract was m:Ae.
A stipulation which might, under ordinary circumstances,
be an inrnaterial one iglht under a different condition
of affairs be one of the utr:ostnjnportance. In Graves
v. Legg, 9 Ex. 709, for instance, the Plaintiffto sell
the defendant a cargo of w , l and covenanted to deciare
the name of the, vessel as soon as the wool was shipped.
At the triJal it was proved that wobl was an article of
flustuating value and not salable till tthe -iame of the
ship had been dealared. It was held that in order to
get at t*e intention of the !arties the co-rt should take
into consideration not only the language of the instru-
merit but also the surrounding circumistances arnit hav-
ing been shown that wool was an article of fluctuating
value and not,,sAlabie until the name of the vessel had
been declared, taey concluded tlht the stipulation after
declaring the. name of the vessel w-s intended by the par-
ties to be of the essence of the contract.
In examining the cases under these r"ules we will
probably gain nothing by going back of the ca.;e of Boone
v. Eyre, 1 il. L1., 273, .0'ote. In this case the plain-
tiff conveyed to the defendant the equity of redemption
of a plantation in the West Indies together with the
stock of negroes thereon in consideration o'1500 and an
annuity of 4160 pounds rer annum for iiis life; and cov-
enant'd thathehad a good title to the plantation, was
lawfully possessed of the negroes and that the defendant
shoiild q-_ietly enjoy it. The defend-nt covenanted, that
the ilaintiff well and truly, performing all and.-ever-
thing therein oontained on his ,art to be perforrTd, he
the defendaM, would pay the annuity. Lreach, the non-
paylnent of the anmuity. Plea, th-At the ylaintiff was
not at t1je time of making -the deed, Ier-llypossissed of
the negroes on the plantation and so had not a good ti-
tle to wonvey. Held on demurrer th-t the plea was bad.
Lord )-ansfield:- "The distinction is very clear, wfore
the mutuial covenants go to the whole (:f the consideration
on both sided they are mutual conditions, the one ipece-
dent to the other. Put where they go only to a part,
where a breach may be paid for in dumages, there the de-
fendant has a remedy on his covenant, and shall not plead
it- as a condition precedent. If this rlea were to be
allowed, any one negro not being the property of the
plaintiff would bar the action'.
There are several cases whioh, though important,
cannot be classified under ary general heading; these I
give here in the order in which they were decided except
in one or two instances where for Trurposes of comparison
I have found it convenient to depart from the general
scheme .
In Glazebrook v.WOodrow, 8 T. Rep., 36(G the plain-
tiff eovenanted to sell to the defendant a sehool house
and to convey the same to him on or, before th'e first of
AuMust, 1797 and to deliver up the possession to him on
the 24th of June, 1796, ard in consideration thereof de-
fend nt covenanted to pay plaintiff'1120 on or before the
13t of August, 1797. Defend:nt was put in possession
on June 24th, but plaintiff did not execute any convey-
ance of property to the defend;-nt. In an action by the
plaintiff to recover the £120 it wes held t at the cov-
enant to convey, and that for the payrment of t-e money
were dependent conditicns and tl~t the plaintiff could
not r:naintain an action for the 120 without averring that
he had conveyed or tendered a conveyance to the defend-
ant. C,,I
It would 3eem as if this ca:-e would come under the
firsit rule as a case where a day is appointed for the do-
ing of an act- and the day is to h: ppen or may happen be-
fore, the promise by the other party is to be pwrformed,
in which case, if that rule were followed, it wo',1d have
to be considered an ill-decided case. Tie decision is
p'it sinly ipon the ground that the agreemrent to convey
wa.3 a substantive part o-f the contract. Lord Kenyon
says:- The very substance of the consideration to enti-
tle the plaintiff to receive the money was the naking of
the conveymnee requires[; and it i3 admitted that ho has
not done it; that JrSkes an end of the question.
Mattock v. Kinglake, 10 A. &-) 30, isa case some-
what sim1lar to the one above, In this case, by artie-14
Oles unvder seal, the 1plaintiff agreed to sell and the
defendant to purchase certain preii.ies. The rlaintiff
covenanted to .:ay, on o)r before the )th day, as consider-
ation for such sale or purchase, a certain sum and to pay
for the colnveance and stainps. Held, th.-,t the convey-
ars was not a condition precedent to not consurrent
with the payment. The case is so decided under the lot
rule to Pofta-e0v. Cole (supra) and, it seems to me, *s
directley in conflict with GlazebrDok V. Woodrow which
the court attempts to di,3tin-uish by saying that in that
case both the acts were to be done aL the same time or at
the same day. Such, in fact , was not the case
4. From
the language used in that Case it would appear that the
ptrties clearly contempla ted that thp payment might be
before the conveyance.
If we hold strictly to the rules of Portage v. Cole,
the decision in Mattock v. Xinglake is right ari that in
Glazebrok v. w odrow, wrong, but id, on the other hand
we are to be governed by the real intention of the par-
ties, as nearaS it can be got at, then the position 
is
just the reverse.
In Stav'3rst. Curling, 3 1ing. N. 0., 355, the plain-
tiff as captain of a South Sea whaler, covenanted with
the defendant that he would proceed to the fisiery and
procure a cargo of Sperm oil, or as great a proportion as
might be under all circumstance., within his power to ob-
tain; would return to Long;on, and ;t his own cost deliy-
ert he cargo; would obey instruction; be frugal of pro-
visions and not dispose of any of them without accounting
for the same; and would not smugglo nor trade nor permit
any on board to do so, Defendants covenanted "on the
performance of the before mentioned terms and condit ions
on the part of the plaintiff" to lay him a certain pro-
portion o' the net proceeds of the cargo. Held, that the
plaintiff's covenants wert independent and that the per-
formanee of them ,:as not a condition precedent to an act,'--
on the defendant's covenant, the court saying, that these
covenants went only to a part of the c onsideration and
that they were more anxious to discover and be governed
by the intention of the parties thar~to follow the strict
and technical form of words used in the agreement.
This would seem to be another departure from the
1st rule to Porka~e v. Cole. Jere a time wus set for
the doing of a aertain act - the slaring of the profits
- anit was to happen after leAfolnanoe by th, other p
party. According to that rule a perfornance would be
held a condition preoedent.
The two following cases arising out of somewhat sim-
ilar circumst',noes and both decided by the same court at
nearly the same time will serve as good illustrations of
the distinction between stipulations going only to a
part of the consideration and those going to the root
of tie agreement.
ilhq first is Dettni v. Gye, L. R 1 Q. L. ., 186.
Here the plaintiff agreed with the defendant, the direc-
tor of an opera compan.y, to take the part of klttnor in
theatres, halls and drawing rooms in the United Kingdom
during his engagement, to begin on the 30th of Miarch,
1875 and t3rminate on Lhe 30 of July, 1875, at a salary
of .150 per month. The plaintiff agre xi to e in London
withot fail at least six days before the coanaencement
of his engagement, for the p.urpose of rehearsal, Plain-
tiff was not in London six days before the comumenoement
of his engagement and the defendant .iought on this ground
to repudiate the contract. HEld, thet the failure of
the rlaintifito be present for rehorsals was not a breah
of a condition precedent but merely a breack of an inde-
pendent agreement for which the defend , nt co-ld recover
compensation in anAetion for damages. Blackburn, J:-
hiie court must acert:kin the intention of the parties,
!is is said by Park, B., in delivering the Juibment of
the court in Graves v. Legg, ' to be collected from the
instrunent and the circumstances legally admissible in
evidence to which it is to b., construed.' He adds:- 'one
particular rule well acknowledged, is that where a cove-
nant or arreemnnt goes to a 1,art of the consideration ol
beth sides and may be comrpensatodin damages it is an in-
dependent covenant or contract.' There was no averment
of any special circumstances existing in thai case with
reference to which the agreement ,ias made but the cmrt
must look at the genercl nature of such an employmentu.
'he court considering the facts, that this is a IOng en-
ga.e3mqntQ1ifteen weeks) to sing in drawing rooms and corn
certs as well as in the op~era, 'and that the f7ilure to
attnd rehearsals coL-1d affect only the theatric-l per-
formanoes for the first week or fortnight, were of oprin-
ion that this did not go to the root of the matter so as
to require them to consider it a condition pfrecedent.
In Poussard v, OIpiers, L. T. 1 0'. T:. ., 410, the
plaintiff agre d with the defen&Vnts to sing and play in
the chief fe-.'le rart in a new opera, about to be brought
out at defendfnt's theatre, for throe inonths, provided
the opera ran for th:t time, cortrmnain, on or ebout the
14th of 1Thovember, The first jerforar.nce .,.as announced
for Gi .. Z$.th f November, and no objection was raised by
the plaintiff as to this deLby. "he attended several
i-ehearsals, 3such attendance being an impfied part of the
contr3(t, though not expwessed. ;,ing to delays of the
composer the latter pa rt of the opera was not in the
hands of the defendints until a few days before the 28th
of November -,nd the £inal rehearsal did not take place
till the beginning ,f the last week. Plaintiff was ta-
ken ill and was unabl to attend any of the rehearsals in
that week; :nd it beirg uncertain how long her illness
mibht continue, defondi.nt's manager mde -,. proisional
engagement with another artisb, 1iss -- to study the
rart and take it if rlaintiff was unable. If she Waa
not wanted 14isswas to receive a douceurt If she wrs
called on to -erform she ..;as to receive Sib per week un-
til the 25th of December, if the piAece ran so long The
plaintiff continued too ill to attend the rehearsals or
the first performanse on the °2th oif .overrber or the
three following daps. iviiss I-- accordin ly performed
on these days. On tlev 4th ,of gecembei' the plaintiff was
well enougih to -erform and tnderedi her services which
the defendant refuseA to accep t, on which the plaintiff
brought an action for wron7fu] dismisA*&t. Hold, that
th- plaintiff"3 inability to perform on the opening -md
early performances, went to the root of the matter and
justified the defendont in rescinding the contract. Elaok
burn J.; "If no substitute capable of performing e
adequately couild be obtaindd except on the terms th-; t
she shoild be p1r4nently engaged at a h~ghev• pay than
the plaintiff, in our opinion it followi, as -, matter of
law that the failure on the plaintifl's part went to the
root oi the matt )r and dischmnaged the defendant.
Sales by Description.
Where goods faile to answer the description under
which t4ey are sold such fVilure goes to the whole con-
s~deration and the vendee Is not bound to accept the
goods delivered. This rule is so well settled that no
authotities need be cited but it is difficult in srme
cases to say *hat wil amount to a dec2,iptien.
In Sikephr.1d V. Kain, 5 r. 2.: Ald. 240, a vessel was
sold as "a copper fastened vessel" but "these terms were
introduced into the agreernent:- "The vessel to be taken
was all T lwitout any allowance for any defects
whatever". In an action by the vcndee for breach of
warranty, it appeared that the ship, when sold, was only
partially copper fastened and that she was vot what was
known in the *rade as a"copper fastened vessel .  It al-
8o appeared that the plaint iff, before.he boutght her,
had a full opportunity to examine her situation. Held,
that the words "with all faults" must be taken to mean
with all fa~llts which a ship might have consistently
with its being the thing d.escribed. That here the ship
was not a copper fastened Ship at all and therefore a vea
dIct for the plaintiff 1  ,
'iaylor v. Bullen, 5 Ex. 779, a vessel described as
'teak built",i ias sold 'with all f' ults and ,ithout any
allowance for any ,-efect or error wlatever". The vessel
was not teak built. It was held in this case that the
insertion of the word error covered any unintentional
misdeseription so as to shield the vendor in the absence
of fraud, from any responeibility for error in describing
the vessel as teak bnilt.
In Allen v. Lake, 18 Q, E., 580$ it was held that
a sale of turnip seed as 04krvings vfedos" was not a
sale with a warranty of quality, but with a description
of the article; and that the Oontract waapot satisfied by
the tender of any other seed than "4kirvings4wedes'.
In "iol v, Godts, 10 Exch., 191, there waj a s'le
of *foreign ref ized rape Ail warranted only %qual to sam-
plea*- The oil tendered corresponded with the samples
but the jury found that it was not "freign refined rape
oil'. Held, that the purhaser was not boun4 to re-
oeive it it not being the article desoribed. The sale
by sample had reference only to the quality.
Bannewnan v. WhIte, 10 C, Bo N. S.t 844. Upon a
treaty for the sale of hops (by sample) the proposed buy-
er asked thmeseller if any sulphur had been used in the
growth or treatment of tl*m, addin"p that he wo'1d not
akk the prie It sulphur had been used. The seller
thereupon asserted that no sulphur had been usead. After
the hops had been inspected, veoihed and delivered, the
buyer discovered that sulphur had been used in the aiclti-
vat-lon of,.a portion of the hopes- five acres out of
500. The whole growth, however, vlas so mixed up togeth-
or that it was impossible to seop ate the sulphured from
the znsulphured hops. Held, that the representation tht
no sulphur had been tsed, was a substantivo part of the
contract and that the use of sulphur avoided the cn-
tract. -rle, C. J., "The questir.n (for the jury) was,
'Was the affirmation that no sulphur had been used in-
tended, between the parties, to be a part of the con-
tract of sale and a warranty by the plaintiff?' and the
jury answer'.d this question in the affirmative. The ef-
fect of this finding of the jury, t ken with the evidence
is now to be considered . We avoid the term warranty
because it is used in two senses, and the term condition
because the question is whether that term is applicable.
then the effeot is tht-2t the defendants required, -and the
plnintiff gave, his undert:,king that n, sulphur had been
used. T his undertaking was a preliminary stipulation;
and if it had not been given the defendant would not
have gone on with the treaty which vesulted in the s-le.
In this sense it was the condition upon which the de-
fendantsacontract3d; and it would be contrar;, to the in-
tentioM exp-essed by this stipulation that the contract
sho ild remin valid if sulphur had been used. 1he intem
ti,'n of the y arties governs in the ,okir-t" and construc-
tion of all contracts. If the pirties so intend, the
sale may be absolute, Ilf"^a warranty superadded; or the sa&
may be conditional, tqbe null if the wqrranty be broken.
And upon this statemrent of i acts we think that the inten-
tion appear3 that the cont-ract should be n1l if sul-
phur Lid been used."
In Josl v. Kingsford, 13 C. R. . S., 447, the
sale was of oxalic acid which had been examined #nM ap-
proved and a great part of it ised by the purohaser be-
"ore he discovered the imurities. The vendor did not
warrant Lhe quality, On. analysis, iL ,-1as found to be
chenicallj impure, from adultrration ,ith sulph,.te Cr
magnesia, a defect not visjbl, to the nke,' eye, no r
likelyr to be discovered even by an experienced person.
lhere were t o count; in the declaration, one for breach
of contract to deliver the moxalic acid", the other for
breach oi warranty "LhLt the rood, were oxalic acid.
Frle, C. J., told the jury that there was no evidence of
a werranty, and th,t the question was, whether the a r-
ticle d,elivered c:.me under the denomtination of oxalic ac-
id in comnereial languasre. Held that the dirictirn was
right. Pz e '
In Aenmar v. Castella, I. T. 2 C. P., 4Z1, the plais-
tiff sold cotton to the defendant through a broker under
the following contract:- "Sold by order and for account
of A J7. C. Axemar, & Co., to Messrs A. Castella & Co.,
D C
the following cotton, viz., - 121 bales at 25 d. perC
pound expected to arrive in London per Cheviot from- Mad-
rM. The Cotton guaranteed equal to the sealed sample
in our poseession. " The sealed sample was a sjnple of
*Long staple Salem cotton". The cotton turned out when
landed to be not in accordance with the sam, le, it being
"Western Madras instead of *Long staple Salem'. The
contract contained a clause, "Should the quality prove
inferior to the guarantee a fair allowance to be made."
It was admittad that'Western Madras' cotton is interior
to Long staple Salem" and requires machinery for its non
ufacture different for that used for the Atter. Held,
that this was mot a case of inferiority in quality, but
of difference of kind; that there was a condition pree-
dent and not simply a warranty 2nd that the defendant
wprs not bound to accept the cotton tendered.
This ease is apparently a doubtful one. In the o-
pinion of the Court it seems to be taken for granted that
t-he what th vendee bargained for was "Long stale Sa-
le". 3u0c1, however, does not oearn to have been the
c se,,,and what he got was cotton. ;,,o particular kind
of cotton -was rantione4, though thet'e was a sti-.uation
that it should be equal to a riven sample. True, that
sample wa§' ongstaple Salemtl, " ut Lhe cotton might nave
been equal to the sample though it did not rappen to be
that !'articular br.nd, ihe words "equal to" woild seem
to import quality rather than hind. An important ele-
ment in this case and one on which it may be distinguish-
ed is the fact that the cotton tendered to the vendee re-
quired different machinery for its mnufacture than Ot-
ton similar to the sample shown to him.
In Hopkins v. Hitchcock, 14 C. B. N.3., 65, se find
ai apparent limitation to the rule that a misdeseription
avoids the contr act. It appears here, th1t the plain-
tiff, Hopkins & Co., hL4d ucce';dcd to the firm of Snow-
den anA Hiopkins, Iron Manfaetur:rs, who werein the habit
of sm-mpleing their iron";3. 34 with a cron. The de-
fendants Lpjlied to lurchase "H. & . iron through a
broker, and were informed that all iron r:rde by the firm
was now inarked"H & CO." the defentLnts then ordered
67 tons of the iron, and the broker made the bought note
for "W' tons 11. & 5. crown company bars". '1he iron on
delivery was marked "Hi. & Co. " and was rejected by the
defendants. The Jury found the vriation in the brand
to be of no consequence and gave a verdict for the plain-
tiffs. On motion for a new trial the court refused to
set aside the verdict, holding, that un der the special
fat;ts and circumstances of the case, and the juray having
negatived that the mark was of any consequence, the plaiR
tiffs had delivered the goods in conformity with the de-
scription in the contract.
This case contains, at leaot, a strong suggestion
that where a misdescription is such as not to materially
affect the agreement it will not avoid the contract. It
must be remembered, however, that in this case there were
peculiar circumstances, namely , the fact that the do-
fenunt was aware, before he purchased the iron,that the
stamp had been changed. At the si.rne time the court
seemed to lay more stress upon the fact that the misde-
scription was immateriai, than upon the fact of the de-
fendant's knowledge of tVhe chunge.
Tea Part the Descrip on.
n soe o ta tsf sale which cont;in stipula-
Tiaie a Part of the D" scriptlon
In some contracts of sale which contain a stipula-
tion that the goods are to be s'hied within a certain
time the stipulation as to the tim of Thiprment is a part
of the description of the jy ods. This is only so in
c: ses where a variatio'n in the time of shipment woidd al-
ter t-e character of' goods shirred under a certain nam;
for instance, a June shipment of apples would differ mea-
terially from " October ship;ment hot only as to the
time but as to the quality of the fruit furnished. The
only difficulty that arises here is as to the interpreta-
tion of the expressions "to be shipi 'd' or "shipment'.
Do the- mean that the rood shall be placed on bozaid ship
during the time specified or thlt tho shipment shall be
aompleted before the time expires? The latter was the
view adopted in i;lexander v. anDerzee, T. F'. 7 C. P.
530, in which case the defendant had contricted for the
purchase of 10 000 quarters of nanubian maize for ship-
sent in June and (or) July. Two cargoes wer- tendered
to defendant, the bills of lading being dated respective-
ly the 4th and 6th of June. The loading of the dargos
was commenced on the 12th and 16th of May and finished on
the 4th and 6th of June, more than half of each cargo
having been put on board in May. There was evidence thitt
grain shirped in May was mnore likely to damage by heating
than grain shipped in June, but it does not appear that
any evidence of usage to affect the ordinary meaning of
the words was tendered. At the trial it was left to the
jury to sa-° whether the cargoutin question were "June
shipments" in the ordinary business sense of the-term,
and they found that they were. Held, That the question
was rightly left to the jury. The words were ambig$ous
and might imean, either that the shipment was to be com-
pleted in one of those months, or' that the whole quanti-
ty of grain was to be put on bouad during these months.
In Boweo v. Shand, L. R. 5 ,PP, *as., 455, the con-
tract was for /the sale of 600 tons Madras rice to be
shipped during the months of March and (or) April. Bills
of lading for various portions of the rice were given ip-
on the 23rd, 24th and 28th of February. The last bill
of lading was given upon the,&th of March but all except
a small portion of the rtoe had been shipped in February.
In an aetion for refusing to accept the rice the defence
was thaft it iatd not een shipped during the months of
caroh and (or) o ril. T!,ere w~s no evidence to show
tha't tt, ::ord2 "to be shipI; :d dur-ing7 ho rontIr3 01' Liarch
and (or) :p'ril" had in trade any other 2i:o.n their natur-
al and ordinary me:ning; on the contrary t-,re was evi-
dence th:.t they were used in their ordirvirix and natural
sense, Ield, theit the natural meaning of the stipul -
tion s t- the shipment -,;ao thoat th whole of the rice
should be Tut on board during the months mentioned' and
that, in the absence of any trade usAge to affect the
meaning of the words if wa'i for the court to construe
the icontract . This dicision o the l(*,us of Lords ef-
fectually disposes of the decisions in Alexander v. Van-
derzee.
Ne gt4e0e-Pape r
Comin, the head of"sale by Kescrijtion" is . classof
cases in which it has been held that the vendor of bill-3
of "xchange, note , shares, crtificates, and other secu-
rities is bound, not by the collateral contr-ct of war-
ranty, but by the principal contract itself, to deliver
as a condition precedent that which is genuine, not that
which isy±alse, oountetfeit, or not marketable by the
name or deuomination used in describing it. (Benj. AS-
§607/.)
In Gompertz v. Bartlett, 2 E. & B. 849,.there was a
sale of n foreign hill of exchange. It turned out that
the bill was not a ftoreign bill -nd therefore worthless
because not stamped. Held that the rurchaser was enti-
tled to recover back the price because the thing sold was
not of the kind described inthe sale.
In Guerney v. W;rmsley, 4 P. & P., 33, a bill of
exchange was sold to the plaintiff on which d-l the sig-
natures were :forged except that of the last endorser who
had forged all the precoding. Lord Campbell, C. J44At& 4
*After the repeated decisions the oouitthonght it must
be settled law, that the plaintiffs were under suah ojr-
cumstnces entitled to reeovor the money r&&d On a con-
sideration'which had failed'.
Bramwell, who acted for the defendant in this case,
made strenuous efforts to distinguish it from the prooed-
ini cases on the ground that in thos,)v cases the thing
sold was entirely failse and worthless; whereas, in this
case the sioature of the last indorser was genuine and
the billAtherefore of some valuie. The casf.e which he
atterapts to distinguish seam to ber him out in his di3-
tinction, see Jones v. Ryde, 5 Ta"nt., 486, and Young v.
Cole, 3 Ping IT. C., 274, in both of wAhich cases the ins-
strument sold were worth no more then the Taper upon
which they were written, and in both of which the court
seems to hnvebaseA its decision on the ground that there
was a total failure of consideration. BEsanquet, J.,
in Young v. Cole, stys:A- ' I agree in the i rinciple of
the c,-ses cited as t o breach of Varranty but this is not
a case of that description. Tlere no consideration has
been given for the money receted by the defendant: the
bonds he delivered to the plaintiff were nt Guatemala
bonds but, on the stock exchange worthhess paper-* The
court in Guerney v. Wormsloy did not however adopt Bram-
well's view of these cases, nor would they h:.ve been
right in so doing. There is no doubt that in the ordi-
nary case of slale of good.3 or merchandise, as a cargo
6f grain or a specifieJ quantity of hops, t,2 rood; must
answer to the description under .vrich they were sold or
the buyer has a right to reject them and rpcover back
the price, and this irrespective of the question as to
whether the goods delivered were of any v'.lue or not, *..d
and there is no good reason 31,o id not aprly to sales of
eommeri1-!l paper. It is now s-ttled beyond doubt that
it does.
Merchatibility Under Desaription
-0-
Mellor, J., in Jones v. Just, L. I. 3 Q. B., 197,
says:- *In every contract t o supply goods of a speei-
fied description which the buyer has no opportunity to *-
spect, the goods must not only in fat answer the speel-
fied description but must also be merchani -e or sale-
able under that description." This, however, was an
action for damages for bneaeh of an implied warranty.
There is a warranty that goods shall be merahantable but
it is not a oondition precedent. There are cases, sauh
as Young v. Oole, and Jones,. Ryde, supra, and
Lattimore, 9 B. & C. 259, where the goods answered to the
description but were absolutely valuelesa and in these
cases it was held that the vendee w.-s not bound to ao-
cept the goods. The decisions in these cases proceead
upon the theory of a total failure of consideration.
It is for the court to say whether the language of
the contract amounts to a description of the subject mat-
ter or not but the question as to whether or not the good
delivered answered to the description is for the Jury.
See hLitchell Newhall, 15 M. & 'i. 308, per Rolf,e.B., p.
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3ale of Clrgo
-0--
In the ease of the sale of a eargo question has a-
risen whether the delivwiry of a complete cargo is a con-
dition precedent. It would seem that this would depend
largely upon the circumstances in eaih particular case,
It does not seem as if, in the ordintry case, failure to
deliver a complete caroo would go to the root of the
whole agreermntp but it is easy to conceive of a case
where it would.
In Kregger v. Blanok, L. R, b 8xo., 179, the do-
fendant ordered of the plaintiff "A snall eargo of lath-
wood of about the following lengths etc. in all about
6 3 cubic fathoms." and the plaintiff's accepted the order
The plaintiffs, not being able to procure a vessel of the
exact size, chortered a vessel to the defendant's port
loaded with 8. fathoms. On ariivul of' the vessel the
plaintiff*a agent unloaded, measured, and set apart tim-
ber to answer the defendant's order ,nd tendered him a
34.
bill of lading fcr that quantity, and a draft for accept-
ance. Deferdant declined to accept (,n the f-round thet
the cargo was in exeess ,f the order. Mfeld, tht *car-
go'meant the whole cardo and not a partial of' a cargo and
that plaintiffs had not complied with the order so as to
entitle them to maintain the actionS 4e
Kelly 0. B., gives the following reasons why the
stipulation for a- Ocargo" shcpId bb held to mean an en-
tire cargo. Ie says,- "There might be a general lien
for freight upon the whele eargo, which the defendant
might be eOmpaled to satisfy though interested in only
a part of the cargo. There might be a dispute as to
the quality arising oltt of the mixture of the defendants
timber with other timber brought by the same vessel.
Part of the timber shi1ped in one entire bulk might be
lost in a storm# and the question would then arise asto
whose was the timber that was lost and whose was saved;
and, as between two dfferent sets of underwriters which
was liable to make good the loss.'
In Borrowman v. Draytont L. RAExch. Div., 15, the
plaintiffs sold to the defendant 'a cargo of from 2500
to 000 barrels of American petroleum to be shipped from
NewYork, vessel to call for orders etcu. 'the f lain-
tiffs Oharterod a vessel, and put on board three thousand
barrels of petroleum and a b6l1 of lading wlas signed Tnak-
ing them deliverable to the plaintiff. ,s this quanti-
ty did not eonstitute a full cargo, 300 additional bar-"
rels were placed on board which were marked with a dif-
ferelt mark, and for which a separate bill of lading was
signed. Plaintiffs gave notice to the defendant of the
shipment of the 3O00 barrels and were ready to order the
vessel from its port of wall to ony port of delivery
within fte contract, and there to deliver to the defend-
ant the 6 000 barrels and to take the three hundred bar-
rels themselves. " Defendants refUsed to accept. iHeld,
thcft the true eonstraetion of the word cargo meant the
entire load of the vessel which carried it and that there
fore, the defendant was not bound to acaept the oil ten-
dered •
It was said by Sir Barnes Peacock in delivering the
judgment of the court in the Colonial Ins. Co. of New
Fealand v. 1he Adelaide Marine Ins. Co., 12 ip. Cas.,
lo4, that the woild "carfow is a word suscI:,tible of dif-
ferent manings and must be interpreted with referenoe to
the context.
Where the sale of the oirgo is made by a bill of
lading and in the bill of lading the car,'ro is desoribed
as consict~ng of a specified quantity of r-oods^is a con-
dition precedent to the sale thl.:L ,he cargo shall answer
to that description.
In Tamvaco v. Lucas, I E. & E., 581 there -was a
sale of a cargo of wheat "of about 2 000 quarters, say
from 1 800 to 2 200 quarters, seller to guarantee deliv-
ery of *nvoioed weight, a accidents excepted, buyers
to pay for any exces: of weight, unless it be the result
of sea da: age or heating. Papment cash in London in
exchange for usual shipping doauments." Pl,.intiffs oft
fered1 defendants shipping dooumenU for a eargo of wheat
amounting to 2 215 quartars, which dofe-ldant refused to
accept. 11hen the bill of lading was tendered and the
invoice made out the vessel was at sea and naither party
knew what ,as on board except from Lhe shipping doou-
ment:3. When the cargo was delivered from the ship it
was found to consist of more than 18 00# and less than
2 200 quarters. L-rJ.4 Carpbell C. J. :- "The eargo,
although of not an absolutely defined amount, was to be 6
betwwen 1 800 and 2 200 quarters. We think the agree-
ment i1;s that it should not exceed that quantity. If
the cargo offored exceeded that quantity so that, if ac-
cepted , the sellers would have a demand on the purchaser
for payment of more than 2 200 quarters, we think that
he was not bound to accept it. JIt, did not want a larger
quantity, and he could not be expecte3d to be prepared to
pay for -larger quantity. On the tender to him of the
cargo by deliverpf'the usual shipping douments' he
could not have accepted the quantity he agre.d to pur-
chase and reject the excess. It seem s to us quite
clear that hh wvotld h..ve been liable to pay for the ex-
cess, if there had been any; there being no ground here
for saying that the crgo war to be taken at a fixed sum,
for better for worse; and there beinu an express stipula-
tion thait, if the quantity delivered by measurement
should suoceed the estimated weirht, unless from the re-
sult of sea darmge of heating, the purchaser was to pcay
the excess."
In another case between the same par't~es wl E.. .,,
1)92, it was held that the vendee was not bound to accept
a cargo les. then that describe., in th- ,il nf lading.
Sale by InstalmenLs
"In determining whether stipulations as to time of
rerforming contract of sale are conditions precedent the
courts seek simply to discover what the parties really
intended, and if time appears, on a fair consideration of
the language and the circumstances, to be of the essence
Pf the contract stipulations in regard to it will be
held to be conditions precedent." oBenjamin, Par. 593.
CL quest:ien which has caused much trouble is whether
in a contract to deliver good s or to pay for them iniin-
stilmen, s, delivery of or paymnt for one instalment at
the stipulated time is a conditicn precedent. The au-
thorities upon this point ar- numerous and conflicting
but it has at length been :;ettled by a decision in the
House of Lords.
In Hear v- Rennie, 5 H. & 1., 19, there was an a-
green-ant to buy GG7 tons of iron to be shipped in about
equal portions in the months of June, July, August and
September. The plaintiff (the vondor) shipped only 21
tons in )uzut which the defendant refused to accept. In
an action fot the price of the iron it was held that a-
delivery at the time specified was a conditiwn rrecedent
and that the plaintif- could not on.the e facts, main-
tain an action agains t the defend nt for not ccepting.
In Jonassor4v. Young, 4 T. 2, 2., 29G, thle decara-
tion set forth in an agreement by the defendant to pur-
chase as many o~f the plaintiffs N.Gas Coals as one 4.team
vessel to be sent by th- defendant coul, fetch in nine
months. Broach: th't the defendant refused to send a
steam-wessel 1 o fetch divorst cargoSof coal. To this
the defendant pleaded that before any breach by the de-
fendant the plaintiffs broke the cont.ract by detaining
an unreasonable time, and beyond the time permitted by
the contract the vessel sent by the defendnts to receive
the coal. On demurrer, held, that the plea was had.
Crompton, J., "The vice of the Tlea is thut the breach
poes to o.ly a part of the consideration. The argument
for the defendant must go to this length thA the un-
neces:"e'Y detention of the defendant's vessel fcr the
one houY would entitle him to put -n end to the contract,
In TIearzv. Rennie, we must take it that time wes of' the
essence, of the contract"
In 3impson v. Cripjin, L. .- 8 ". B., 14, the de-
fendants agreed to supply the -vaintiff with from six
thousand to eight thousand tons of coal to be delivered
into the plaintiff's wagons at the defendant's oolliert&
in equal monthly quantities durinr a period of twelve +.9
months at 5 s. 6 d. per ton. During the first month the
plaintiff sent wagons to receive only 158 tons. I mme-
diately after the first month had expire,] the defendants
inforrmd the plaintiffs that, as they had taken only 158
tons, the defendants would annul the contract. Plain-
tiff'3 refused to allow the contract to be annulled, but
de9fendants declined to deliver any more coal. Held that
the breach by tho plaintiff in taking lass than the stip-
ulated quantity during the first month did not entitle
the defend.nts to rescind the contract. Bl.ckburn j.:A-
"No suffivient reason has been urgeu why damages would a
not be a compensation for a breach by the i'aintiff, and
wA4-ethe defendant should be at liberty to annul the
contract; but it. is said that Hoarev. Reanie is in point,
and that we ought not to go counter to the decision of a
court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. It i3, however, dif-
fivult to understand upon .hat principle iToargv. ennie
was decided. No rr~son has been pointed out why the de-
fendants sheuld not have delivered the stipulatod quanti-
ty of coal during each of the months after July, although
plaintiffs in that month failed to accept the number of
tons contracted fr. fHoar v. Ronnie was questionled in
Jonnssoh iv. Young". Mellor, J., said he could not dis-
t inguish 11oar v. 'Fennie and 44*edAhard to reconcile that
case with some of the earlier oa:30s. Lush, J., so id he
cozWd not understand the judgm elto; in Jloar v. Eennie and
that the court nust have Anterpret!,d the contract in that
case as if time were 6f its essence.
In 1rooth v. Burr, L. 7'. 9 C. P., 208, the defendant
contracted to sell to th plaintiff 250 tons of pig iron
at 5,; s. per ton half Lo be delivered in two, rmrnainder
In four weeks; payment not cash 14 ,days after the doliv-
ory of each rrel. The market was rising, and notwith-
standing urgent demands by the plaintiff the deliverp of
the first 125 tons was not cor@leted for r, early six montk
Who plaintiffs refased to lay for TIhe first parcel,
claim.ing the right to set off the loss they had sustainid
from being obliged to procure other iron in consequence 0
of the defendant's default but they still urged the doliv
cry of the second parcel. i, 'Ie defend.:nt, treating the
refusal to pay as a breach and abandori.rn nt of the dontraet
by the plaintiffs, refused to deliver any more. Held,
42.
that the mere refusal to pay for the first parcel did not
under the circumstances, warrant the defendant in treat-
ing the contract as abandonmd and refusing to deliver the
remainder. Tord Coleridge, C. J., :- "The true questin
is whether the acts and conduct of th3 larty evinced an
intentien no longer to be bound by the contract. Now,
non-payment on the onv hand, or non-delivery on the other
Iftay amount to such an act, or may be evidence for a jury
of an intention rholly to abandon the contract and set
the other party free. 'ahis is the true principle on
which Hoarey. VPennie was decided, whether rightly or not
upon the facts I will not prestrae to say. Where bu the
non-deliver; of part of the thing contracted for the
whole object of the contract is frustrated, the part,.
rnaking default renounces on his part all the obligation3
ol' the cont 'taet.l
In r'andt v. Lawrence, L. R. 1 Q. B. D., 344, the
defendrnt entered into two contracts, each of which was
for the purchase from the plaintiff of 4500 quarters
Ri-ssian oats, move or less, shipment by steamer or steam-
ers during ..ebruary. Plaintiff shipped in one steamer
4511 quarters to answer the first contract and 1139 quar-
43,
ters to answer in part tho second contract. lie also
sh ppe, -.n another ,tnarmer a sufficient quantity of oa, s
to copplete3 the second oontract. The sh ipment on the
iivst st. mer was made on time, that on the second steam-
er was r!ade too late. The court held that the words
"by steamei or st earners" showed an inkention that the
shipment zhould be made in different rarcels and not In
Lwo specific lots, so that the case was brought within
the principle ot Simpson v- Crippen and the defendfant wv!;
bound to accept the 11o9 quarters in part fulfilment of
the second contract.,
In Reuger v. Sala, L. R. 4 C. P. D., 239, the con-
tra,,t was for the sale, by ihe 'lAntiff to the defend-
ant of 25 tons Penang pepper, name of vessels to be de-
clared. Plaintiffs declared 25 tons by a particular v-
vessel, only 20 tons of which complied with the t.,rms of
the contract as to shipment. It v-s held b9t he maJor-
ity of the court that the defendants were not bound to
accept leas thae 25 tons. Erandt v. Lawrence was dis-
tinguished on the ground t hat in the ease tnder consid-
eration the plaintiffs had named only one ship ,nd made
one indivisible shipment. Brett, L. J., dissenting
says:- "The gener"- principle * b deduced from
thes3e cases is Lhat, where, in crc:antilo ontract of
purchase and sa le of Gooda to be delivered 3fld accepted,
the terms of' Lhc3. contra t a.llo-A the deliv~ry to behu-
cesaive doliverie:3, the f::ilure of tU selilr or buyer
to fulfil his p1,rt in any one -or more of those deliveries
does not absolve the othc& I rt. from tendering or acoepL
ing in the case of other subsequent deliveries, olthough
the contract was for the purchase and sale of a specified
quantity of good.. , and althouC,., the fsilur"i of the party
s'-in as to one or more deliveries -,,ias incurable, in the
sense thnkt he 'could never fulfil his undertaking to ac-
cept od deliver the whole of the 73-ecified qu:ntity. The
r,asons given are, that such a breach by the plarty suing
is a breaCh of only a part of the consideration moving
-rori tha t such ) breach can be compensated in dam-
a;;es -:ithol.'t any necessity of annuling the whole contract
that the whole con3truction of these contractfsi that it*
is not contrary to the obligation to tender or ,,zccept a
part; that the other rarty should hr,.vo !oon or should
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be, always ready and willin on, ,ble to aecept or tender
the whole"-
Ij Honek v. Muller, L. R. 7 Q. E. D.J, 92, the de-
defendaUt sr,ld to the plaintiff 2 00(i tos e ig iron to
be delivered to the ilaintiff f.'ee on boarl at makers
wharf in Z oven1er or equally oveiNovembe' ]ecember ,.nd
January -t ; d. per ton extra. Plaintiff failed tortke
delivery of the iron in Noveonb" but claimed to h ve de-
livery of one third oi the iron in Decem ber :nd one thir)'
in January. he defenda&A refased to eliver these two
thirds and rave notice that he considered that the con-
tr.act was cncelled by the plaintiff's breach1 to take iny
:ron in Novemiber. 1eld, that the defend.nt was justi-
fied in refusing to deliver the two t':irds. a majority
of the court followed td- cab:-cd T-oarev. Pennie (supra)
In thie MIrsey Steel and Tron Co. v. llalor, L. T.
U Ap. Gas., 434t the defend nts had agreed to purchase
from the plaintiff 5 000 tons steel blooms " elivery
monthly commencing January next, paymont net c"sh ,rith-
in three dV-.rs after receipt oi" shipl ing documents".uPLii-
tiff- delivered part of the first instalment b!t before
payment became due a winding up petition viz-As v~esented
and defendants, acting upon a mistake of law refused
pending the bankruptcy petition, to Tay for the steel l-
ready 4elivered. Plaintiffs treated the refusalx to
pay as a brea*h or the contract and refused to make fur-
ther deliveries ,jlthough the defendants were ready and
Vfiiliw to pay for them and offered to do so. It vss
held, without a dissenting opinion, that the failure
to 1,-Y i'or the one instalment did not a void the contract
on the ground, that such a failure only -,ent to a I art of
the consideration. Their Loitdships intimate tLt in or-
der to avoid the contract the conduct of the rlarty must
amount to an absolute refusal to ;,e:cform.
,.ae effect of this desision would seem to be that
pa~i1ent for one instaln-ent uan never be a condition pre-
cedent to the right to claim delivery of the remaining
instalments; a nd it cannot be urged with any show of rea-
son tiut the same rule does not apply to a delivery of an
instalment of goods. ±he saineiriaciple is pp'licable
to both cases. In both the failure goes only to a,part
of the consideration.
the-e ar2 several cases coming under the 4th of ir.
Benjamin's rules xhich require some consider.. tion. In
.'tkinson v. Smith, 14 M & W., 61J5, there was an agree-
nent in the following words,'Bought of Messrs Atkinson
& Co. about thirty packs of Cheviot fleeces, and agreed
to take the under mentioned noila; also agreed to draw
for 25O on account at three inonths. The defendant r,-
f£,sed * o deliver the noils. Held, that he could not r-
cover ; rithout ave4ng and -rovin- as a condition 7rece-
dent :he delivery an tender of all the rleces. In
ihers v. Reynolds, 2 B. : /d., C2, the defenda.nt a-
to furnish the rlaintiff with straw at the rat, of
thr'- loads a fortnight at 30 s. per lo,d for each load
of straw delivered on his premises during a certain pe-
riod. After the .3tr-:zw had heen supplied for sorne time
the rlaintiff refused to pay for the last load delivered
and eee-i,-&e-d in always kceping one load in arrearS. Held,
tht the true int,-nt of the agreement was th ..t each lood
,zv to be paid for on delivery, and that on the plain-
tiff's i-fus ,l to pay for them the dcfendant was not
bound to send any mori. Patteison, J. :-" If the
plaintiff had merely failed to pay for any partiulr
load that of itself right not have been an excuse for
the defendant for delivering no more strew: but the
plaintiff h:,e expressly refuses to psy for -he load; ,le-
liv.red; ,lrxi the defendi.'nt, therefore, is not liable for
cea3in to perform his part of the contr1.ct.
The above quotation iddicates the distinction be-
tween this c.8se and others such as the hersey 3tool .rd
Ir.on CO. v. Naylor (supra). 1ere the breaeh was not on-
lY rs to one load but the plaintiff absolu .ely and posi-
tively refused to carry out the contract according to its
terms tAproposeA to subhtitute -,,not,,r one its place.
In Pa;kart v. BoWers, L. K.. 1 C. P. ,404, there was
, writt f agreement by which the Ilaint'iff aqroed to pur-
cha;e crtcin lands and all thV mines, threads and vein3
of coal etc. under the same, st .' certain arie-; - n
-the def3nd:nt agreed to purch.so from the plaintiff all
toia coml that he lidit from time to time requireat a
fir market price. held, that these ere conur-rent aoe
acts. and that the plaintiff could Dot maintain an ac-
tion a-ainst t-e defendant for not takring th: coal with
.ut Lverring perform ane or r~adines to perlform his
r. Benjamin s -"But it must be borne in mind
that to entitle t he seller to rescind the contract, the
alts or conduct of the buyer murst either amount to an ex-
press re)fusal or manifost a complete inabil " 6- , to Ier-
form his pavt (AL' the contract.' he cites Coreoran v.
Pros2 r, 2J. k. Rer., 222, and h:loomer v. hern 3tien, L.
P. .. P. % '. , (Benjamin on Sales . L-U2, A,).
The 5th rule given by renjamin will be found in sub-
stance in the opinion of ;ervis, c. J., ;n Roberts v
IBrett, 10 C, E. 561, S. C. bC L. This rule is prietie±6tl-
ly but - ,apitition of. thesaplesed underlying phinoiple
govern iing this whole j4 -±4e@ ,th.t the court will
gather the intention of the parties from the whole instru
sent.
Effect of Part Performance
Where condition precede nt is broken the promis-
ee can repudiate the contract pr ovided It has not al-
ready been partially exeduted in his favor. But, if af-
ter breach the promspee continues to accept performance,
the condition lose s its effect as such and becomes a
varr!rnty in ,..he sense that it can be useat only ift-trhs
wo.*7. ,a means of reeovering damages. Rekn v. Burness
3 B.& S., 756. Park P . in Graves v. Legr 9 9xch, 709,
S. C. 716. says that the reason for this, "Se m to be,
that where a person has reeived a,part of the consider-
ation for which he entered into the a*r-ment, it would 6
be unjust, that because he had not the whole, he should
therefore be parmit*d to enjoy that part without either
payment or doing anything for it. Therefore the law o-
blIges him to perform the agr ement on his part, leaving
him to his .,medy to recovpr any lamage he may heve sus-
taied in not havin receivr the who c consideration
iYorm ,i*r. ianJamin's statmont of the rule (Benjamin
1ar. 5 4) and i om the reasoning above quoted it miaht
be inferred th-t it is inmmaterial whetler the p't rer-
f£ri.ncr relied upon to change the nature of the stipula-
tion of the relation frcm thLt of a condition prece-
dent Lo tha.t of a warranty or independent agreement is
accelt,x before or after the breach of the stipulation.
It seercis more r -asonable to say, and there is authority
f r s:ying, tha.t It is only ,.-here a party ,ccepts part
performance after a breach of th-e stipulation, that he
loses his ri7,ht to r',ly tpon the stipulation +4 P condi-
tirn nrecedent.
In 2llan v. Topp, (" 7xch., 424, by the terms of an
indenture of apprenticeship an infrnt vas pluiced by his
fath 1, s apprentice to a mast r, described in the inden-
ture as an"a:lctioneer, appraiser and corn flctorto learn
his :rt nd with him after the manner of an apprentice
to e-ve"• After the making of the indenture and the
coencent of the apprenticehia the s holy relin-
qudshed the trade of corn factor; Whereuron the appren-
tioe absentea himself from his aster's service. Ifeld,
in an tction OIn the indenture by tho ri st-r ag',inst the
ff.thel for the desertion of the ZpT'rentice, that the re-
linquishment by the i:aster of his, trade of corn factor
aa a good ;irswer to the action.
It was said in a later case that the r ound$ for the
desision in the above case was that, there the plaintiff
Was to c't'tinue to do something which was to be the con-
sideration for the performance on his part 2nd .the case
was in this manner distinguished. (White v. Eeeten, 7
. i., 42,). They say that" they case w, uld be differ-
ent where there Wonly a single :ct to be r,)rformed.
Thi.] may be so, for where there is but a single act to
be performed there would be a breach of condition when
one larty tendered part performnce of that act and if
the other p.,rty accepted th!t part i'erformance he would
accipt part pei fornance -. ftir breach of the.condition and
consqquently would be no lower able to Aely on the con-
dition as a condition but only as a warrant,. In Carter
v. 2cor-ill, L..2. 10 .1 . B., 564, by an a7,reemn. be-
tween the plaintiff and defcnd:-nt, ,±'ter statement of'
the weekly expenditure and profit of the pl intff's bus-
iness as a printer and publisher of a newspaper, it was a
agreed, that, in the event of the business bein, proved
by the, books kept by the plaintiff to realize a olear
profit or ? per week us shown by the above statement,
dofendant should pay plaintiff Jb(O on the 24th of ;e-
aeiber, i0037, Jb0 on the 24th of June, £100 at Christ-
rMast 1868, and J200 within four years from the 2b th of
December, 1867. In oonsideration of the prmises the
Plaintifr agreed to sell to the defendant ::11 the plnt
and furniture on the promises 'and the good will or the
business, with all the earnings subtequent to the Z0th of
,ecember, IS6d, and the house and premises then oocupied
by the plantiff. The defendtnt on the 30th of Decem-
ber, entered Into possession of the house with the plant
end furniture and of the busir*ss, whiah he thenceforth
carried on until he sold it. After the Zapse of four
years the plaintiff brought an action for the iiwtalment
and the defendant sought to set up as a defence that the
busires3 was not i,)rOwd to be worth J7 olear profit
per week. Held# that, asmning that this, if the eon-
tract lad beon .r!ae exeoutory, would have bacn a oondl-
tion peecedent, yet the 1efendart having hald a substan-
ti.:l part of the consideration 4ould not now set up the
non perfranane aS a defence, :ield, J., -- Ir it be
ufed on ther part of the defendant tat If the business
only realized 1-i ttperoweek it would be unjust that he
shoUld pay tho -Irioe which was3 estimateLi ulon realiza-
tion of J7 per week the prwwer is obvious that in the in
terwal between the dato of the and the 30th o f
September, unmd beforc takin, possessirn or within a r- a-
sonuble time he might have ascertained whether the condi-
dion which he now alleges to be precedent wa3 c-ipable 'if
being performed or not and might as soon "- this wzs as-
certained, have repudiated the agreement, and returned
any portion of the con$ideration which he might have re-
ceived in the roeantime. Insteadtof i4 w o he entered
into possession of., ana, carried on, and sold the busi-
ness, and the fair infereonoe is, either that he satis-
fLied himself at. 'Jae time thut in substane the condition
was cipAble -f being perZormed, or thl-t he ;7as indiff r-
cnt whether it was or was -iot, and that the agreement
was of suffialen t value to him for other reasons as to
A.
make it worth his while tha t it should be performed 'd
act.ed upon.
"'We come, therefore, to the conclusion that that wlh4
might have been a condition precedent has ceased to be so
by the defendant's subsequent eonduct In acoepting less
than his bargain, if, in fact, there was any substantial
deficiency". IU
t'his language woid aeorm to sustain the positiOn
that it is only where part performance is accepted after
brrach thtt the condition loses its effect as suoh und
becomes a mer-o warranty.
It will be observed that, in the case of Glazebrook
v, Woodrow, it w ais held that a stipultion in the con-
tract was a condition though part p.i'formance was accept-
ed before broaoh, but the question :.,. to the ofect of
part porformae e does not seem to havo been raised in
that case, In Withers v. Roynolds,(Supra) there was an
acceptan oe of jart porformae before breach for it ap-
pears that some of tbo straw had been delivered msd paid
for before any dispute arose.
Where the Property Passes
1hre, in a contrivet of sale the goods are speoifio
and the property passes a stipulation with respect to the
quality or description of the goods will be hold to be
a warmanty. Where, on the other hand, the sale is of
goods in generAe and the property does not pass such a
stipulation may be he144a Oondition.
In Street v. lay, 2 1;,. & A., 45iG, it was hold that
whero a porson b-ouGht a horse warranted suund, sold it
again and then repurc)ased it, he could not by reason
of tnOa!nnoss resist an action by the origina1 vendor
for the price. Lord Tenterden C. J., in d elivering the
Juainent of the coiurtsaid- "It is not necessary to de-
cide vihether in any case the purohuser of a qeoi~ri
chattel, vho, having, 'ad an opportunity of exeroising
his JdtIgrrnt upon it, has bourht t, with the uranty
that it is of any y .artiaula-r quality or description, and
actually acceptud and ,'reqeived it into his possession,
c n a Lerwards, ipon disaoverinj, that the wqrranty has
not boen complied witht of is own will only, orihout the
conaoulence ol' the other contr1oting party, return the
aht-L1 LO tote vendor., and exonertte himself from the AW
nat r.T the price, on the ground that he has never re-
ceivod LILIL articlo Which he stipulated to purchase.
i-oe is indeod autlority for that position, Lord 2di'
in th mese of Curtis v. Hanni;,y, ':isp P . C ,6
is rported to.,h:!ve said, that 'he took it to be cear
law, Lhat if . Person puiohases a horse that is warranted
sound, and it afterward turns oUL that thG horse was un-.
sound al, the t ie of thc, waxTanty, the buyer might, if he
pleased, keep the horse and bring an action on the 'war-
ranty in which he would have a right to recover the dif-
erenoe between the value of a sound horse andane with
such defects as existed at the tiM of lhl waZTantY; or
he fight return the borse and bring an action to recover
the full mlay l.aid; but in the latter ease, Lhe seller
had a right to expect that the horse should be returned
in the same state he was when sold, and not by any means
diii ished in value', and le proceeds to say that if it
were in a worse sliape Lhan it would have boon if returned
imediately arter the discovery, the purchaser would have
no defence to an action for the pries of'the article.
IL is to be implied that he would have a defence in ease
it were returned in the same state, ."d in a reasonable
time after the discovery.
"'It is extwmaely difficult, indeed impostible to rec-
oncile thia doctrine with those cases in which it has
been held, that where the property in a specific chattel
j s .ssed te the ve*Wee, and the price has been p id,
he is no right* upon the breach oX the warranty, to re-
turn the article and revest the propert. in the vendor,
and recover the price as money paid on a consideration
which Ies '£i1ed, but must sue upon the warranty, unless
there huts beena' oonditi(on in th contract authorizirZ
the rottirn, or the vendor has received back the titls,
and iv.,s thereby consented to rescind tie contracL, or : a
been guilty' of fraud which d1stroys the contract alto-
gether. Weston-i v. Downs, I Doug7. 22, Towers v. Earrett
1 P. , !6t; .ayne v. hihale, 7 ast, 2'/4; Power v.
Wells, o 24 n. and Emnnuel v. Dano, Z Campb., 29
wherethe same dotrine was aj plied to an oxch...nge ow v tit" a
As to :,I $&le, and the vendee held not to be en-
titled to sue in t'vOver forv t.o chattel deliveredb, b v;ay
of barter, for another received. If theac cases are
rightly decided, and we think t Ae nro, au:d they certain-
ly have been always act-d upon, it is clear thait thl pur-
chaser o n not by his own acts 31one Unless in t}'h ex-
eepted cases abo-e -entioned, rewest the Froperty 'in the
seller, and recover the price when r& id, 6n the round bf
the total failure of considoration; and it seem s to fol-
low that he cannot by the "same means, protect hi.mself
from the payment on the s'me ground.
It is to be observed, thA althoak.;;h the vendee of a
speoiife chattel, delivered with a warranty, M 7 not have
a right to return it, the same re'ason does not apply to
cases r-f executory contracts, wher- an article, for in-
stance, is orderred from a manufacturer, who contracts it
sh!,ll be of . certain quality, or fit for a certain pur-
pose ird te -..rticle sent as such is never completely ac-
copted as such by the party ordering it. In this and s6-
,imilt-w c iue thetttter may return it as soon as he dis-
covers the defeat, provided he han done nothing more in
the meantime th§ n was necessrary to give it a fair trial,
Okoll v. Jmith, 1 Stark., N. P. C., 107; nor would the
purchaser of a cmodity, to be afterwards delivered ac-
cordingr to srple, be boun4 to receive the bulk, wiah
rm- not a'vre^. with it; nor after havinm received what
,7-s tenr_1red and llivered as beinr, in eccordanoe with
the 2 rtple, will he he precluded by the simple receipt
Prom betturninp the article within a reasonable time for
thi pi-pO,ie of examination and comparison. The obsor-
v-tions above stated are,intended to rpply to the parchase
of a certain specific chattelaesepted and received by the
venree and the roperty in which is completely and en-
tirely veet in him 00
The decision In e*yworth v. Hutchinson, L. R. 2 Q.
'9. * :eoO ':j to ieavs it open to €o;,bt whetdr a stip-
is not neoesaartly a warranty in :J.1 cases w.here
the roods a-e slecific, zuid no only in cz~ae., where the
goods ar aslieoiric and the properLit ;::assos. in tLis 'Xe
the defendiats boujht t of whe plaintiff at a ,rice larned,
"4 ,bAle: or wool to arrive ex -iges or any vesse! thaj
L: be trans-shipj ed in, The wool to bo ruarrantead to
be about equal to samples in Lii; .elling broker's posse-
ion and if ,ny 8*spuLe arises it shall be decided by the
sallnijo brokers viise decisit;n shall be final" On arz'i-
vL. 4., the o ,l it turned out not about equal to sLmrpJIe
arid the br okurs -x'ter protost f£rom the dei'endant, awarded
t±i!,,t the doferd int aliould Lake it a aCerftain abatem'ent
Of th price of dileVerent balas. It 'ivs held Lt1uL tle
Ilaendant oo;41d not reject the wool on aeoeunt oJ its in-
.,i,'ioritj bit was bound to t&,e iL aocordine to the oon-
ditions of the broker's award. Cookbu.n4, (' J.,
"The terms oi' the e nLraot seera to me -Croe from any r-a-
,3onablo doibt. this contract il for L-je sIaleJ r;p salf-
ic wool to arr ive by a ,.t iou.ar siJi; tico; are ear-
marked, so as to I-,'evcri the cntracL ap, lyin! to any -
other wool; and the- arao guaranteod about similar to sam-
ples. If the matter stood there, thia -oinq the sale of
specific goods, t~hOUgh with a warranty, there would not
be tiny Yiight or power on the p:rt of th-) buyer to reject
the goods on the p 4 of their not being aonforrnable to
saplesj, but the buyer's remady would be either by aress-
action on the warranty or by giving the inferiority in
evidence in reduction of damnages. 1here is nothing in*
the contraot to impott a condition that the buyer shall
be at liberty to rejest the wools if not about similar to
sample". *
Blaokburn, J.:- eThe contract relates to the par-
tioular bales of wool speified and to t"!oso only and the
additional clause, that the contract is to be off if the
bales are previously sold in'4l'ew York, shews that the com-
tract is confined to this particular hoargro. Then the
wools are, 'guaranteed about similar to samples'. Now
such a clause may be a simple guarantee or warranty, or
it ni;;Y be a eandition, Generally speaking, when thi coa-
tract iS as to any fsoods such is a condition roing to th.
osene of the ontraot. i-ut when the carntract As as to
s8POi'ic go4s, th' 0AI use is only coll:.-teral to the con-
traCt and Is th,- oubjeat of a cross action, or matter in
reduition, of damages.'
'T'ho observations above quoted ,ro rerely dieta, thf
czSe h"vinV heen decided upon another point entirely# but,
even s such, if they embody a correct exposition of the
I-S) it should be, they !re entitled to rteiht in
spite ,f the fact tihat thewr rte directly opposed to the
principles laid down in a prior ca3e.
T.he question then is whether or not the view adopt-
ed by th Iearied judges who decided Tsayorth v* Hutehin-
.5on i: correct, or whether th-'. true rule is that AnmO-m
sed in Street v. Elay.
It is hard to understand why there should be any
distinction upon this point between the cases where spe-
cific rgood: are. sold and those trher , ood; are sold -in
r eno.' t-,.esp-cially in otstes where, nlthoigh the goods
4 specific, the vendee has had no opportunity of in-
spectinr them and some tct remains to be donm before the
•raperty passes.
The rt le that a stipulntion as to specific goods the
property in which h s passed cannot be a cndition would
seem to beibut a lor7io-.l consequence of . doctrine
that khere a pmoty has accepted r art y erformance of a
contract after a breach of a Ocndition the condition
aoas*s toL be available as such and beco,,ee a mere warra-*,.
The vendee, onco the property h:as paaed, cannot rejoct
the oods. 'he passing of the pror -'ty itnt !ies accept-
anco on hia r-art, If the gooda whon he acceptecd theri,
did noL covrespond to sample or description, '-. has ac-
ceptedl t %,m aftor a breach of thz3 stipulation and there-
fore the stipulation is no longer available as a oondi-
tion buL nmerely as a warrantyo
It would follow naturally from this thut in all cas-
es 4herz the property has passed th2 stil-ulations must
be regarded simply as warranties, for instanuoe wheri. the
property p,-ses by selection and appropriation by the
It is Impossible to find a s'ingle case a:here any rea-
son is given why, merely bec.iuse thd goods ro specific,
atipU.lati(,ns in respect to them must be considered -s
wi.rranties an.,it seems equally impossible to conceive of
any good reason why this sh'uld be so. it is also dif-
ficult to conceive of any good r ason v:ic, th-.re should
be aun,, distinction between ti c:.se whero n.e goods are
specific and the property, t'2sses and thatL ',whoro the Moods
are aold in genere and the propert- .- sss. In th,? one
case the vendee has had an opporttmity to inspect the
goods himself; in the other, if he hes not delegated
that rirht Lo the vendor, he h2S & icit to insroct the
roods ind the poro.tyr n t em iill not pas until he
hues hatd an ou port'nity to exercise tn;t viTt.
Yithi I' O p C t, now., t) the se Lw&(: vulus- t>: t 4,>OVC
For:t Perfarnn nca :. accepted afteor brtm...ch of ,Ii, cr'ndi-
tic"', tho condition loses it offoct vs 32'chi ."tnd bOCO-OS
-aty,nd., hn t hus, boon :ointod ott aS bein
a moe conseq unce of the above rule, J. nt O re tOn,
goods are ascertained and thQ propurty pa ,sea thereM ia
only a warranty-- the ," arc saveral cases w>±ch rcquir-
explanaticn. On Q-' these is , oslija.g ! 1 nvsi'ord (tp-
iii), in Wi}ich case, though the i,'oVorty in th go.ots h.od
pass od, the venLIeo recovore-%d, not for a bronch of warr'a4l;
but for a broach of 1oe v ntraot. The only re'e;sonable
oxtie nutlur rof this case is tha;t as timj nndcr hn nver
doliverdd oxrlic. acid thep, i.d novox been iny rperform-
,100 Vc a, t . e,'fo,n c of t hpar o ntru. ct &thouh ,o.e
gooe cd been aelivered. This is tho only 7 rolnd upon
which snn,-er yuan v. ito, (suyra), can be [t pl]? d, fo r tile--
the goods wrro 3 r' lcific atnd tin joro trty iu:'d p.zssed -,nd
Still the vcnd, successfully defended an action tor the
pice. This could only be on the ground that, as the
04
vendee had contaoi :d for unsulphiurod hois and,
sulphured hlops, a very dji'P irent article as t 7o evidenoe
ahowed, the eitr.ct nevr had bern fulfilled b the Vr-
dor.
